ESPIONAGE: IT PLAYS AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE COLD WAR

Trial of Penkovsky Reflects the Reliance on Spying by Both Sides To Gather Intelligence in the Interest of National Security

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WASHINGTON, June 1—The Soviet press renewed its demand this week for vigilance against Western intelligence agents. This may seem asinine to Westerners in the light of the Soviet Union's own frequently exposed espionage operations, but it was prompted by the Penkovsky case that appears to have jolted the Russian high command.

According to their own testimony, Oleg V. Penkovsky, a fairly high Soviet official, passed military, scientific and economic secrets to Grenville M. Wynne, a British businessman, who acted as courier for American and British intelligence. Their trial in Moscow ended with the announced execution of Penkovsky and the sentencing of the Briton to eight years' confinement.

Of course, neither the American nor British Governments would concede to the accuracy of the espionage charges, even if they were true. But the years have long since passed when Americans particularly were innocent of the lengths to which their Governments may go to obtain vital secrets from other governments in the interest of national security.

A classic example of this innocence was the observation of Henry L. Stimson, who as Secretary of State under President Hoover abolished a code-cracking outfit that deciphered messages of foreign diplomats stationed in Washington.

"Gentlemen do not read each other's mail," Mr. Stimson explained. He subsequently changed his attitude insofar as governments were concerned and fully supported the successful United States intelligence operations on the eve of and during World War II when he was Secretary of War.

The U-2 and Since

Nevertheless, Americans generally have been loath to subscribe to the so-called black arts.

In recent years, however, any Americans who remained naive about their country's use of these arts in peacetime had their eyes opened by the clandestine U-2 flights over the Soviet Union, the frank exchange of the U-2 pilot, Francis Gary Powers, and the Soviet spy, Rudolf Abel, and the many official and unofficial statements on intelligence that have been published.

In this contest, Allen W. Dulles, the former head of the Central Intelligence Agency, wrote: "The overt collection work of State and Defense, though of great value, is not enough. The special techniques which are unique to secret intelligence operations are required to penetrate the security barriers of the Communist bloc."

The overt collections cover the press, books, periodicals, official repofts of government proceedings, radio and television announcements and similar materials available to all. To trained analysts, these overt materials may even provide "secrets."

Missing Pieces

Careful perusal of openly available information provides substantial basic intelligence for government policy-makers. But, as Mr. Dulles pointed out, this is not enough. On the basis of overt collections, special assignments must be developed to obtain vital missing shreds of evidence about other governments' policies and intentions.

An important United States coup in this respect was the acquirement of the text of the famous secret speech by Premier Khrushchev denouncing Stalin at the Soviet Communist party's 20th Congress in 1956.

How it was obtained is still a secret. But evidently the United States, while late in adapting itself wholeheartedly to this form of international relations, has engaged in a variety of clandestine activities including the use of "agents," "operatives," "sources," "informants" and "volunteers."

The question remains, of course, how much does the United States rely upon information obtained in this way. Again, no American sources would be willing to say. According to a former Russian spy, Alexander Orlov, who defected and is now in this country, the main distinction between Soviet and United States intelligence doctrine is as follows:

"The Russians take the view that important secrets of foreign states can and should be procured directly from the classified files in the government departments of those states and from foreign civil servants who agree to turn over state secrets to the Soviet Union.

"On the other hand, the Americans, and to a certain extent the British, prefer to rely more heavily in their intelligence work on the collection of information about foreign states from legitimately accessible sources such as library research, foreign newspapers, military and scientific journals, foreign parliamentary debates, encyclopedias, and statistics."

Mr. Orlov, who discusses the subject in a book "Handbook of Intelligence and Guerrilla Warfare," reflects his own inclination to the Russian technique. He insists that clues to the intentions and plans of potential enemies cannot be found in libraries and encyclopedias. But he appears to have overdrawn the American attitude. In fact, Mr. Dulles explained in Harper's Magazine recently that the particular tactic to be used in obtaining information depends upon the specific objective.

If the information can be obtained in ordinary channels, by diplomats or by close study of published materials, the intelligence services need not be